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REPLY TO GRIMES: ILLUSORY DISTINCTIONS
AND SCHISMS IN TYING LAW
KEITH

N.

HYLTON

MICHAEL SALINGER*

I. INTRODUCTION
We applaud Professor Grimes's thoughtful analysis' of the D.C. Circuit's decision in United States v. Microsoft2 (Microsoft III) and of our
article.3 Professor Grimes has entered into precisely the debate that we
argued should lay the foundation for the law on tying. In addition, one
of Professor Grimes's themes is that the issues of tying law cannot be
viewed in isolation but, instead, within a coherent philosophy of antitrust.
We agree with him on that principle.
However, we do not agree with Professor Grimes in every detail or
even in his major conclusions. The vast majority of instances of tying
are beneficial and the prevalence of beneficial ties has important implications for tying doctrine. 4 In addition, the best way to place tying doctrine
on economically sound footing and to make it consistent with other
antitrust doctrines-including Eastman Kodak' -is to overturn the modified per se rule of Jefferson Parish.6 Finally, Professor Grimes argues that
informational asymmetries between buyers and sellers lie at the heart
of the antitrust objection to tying and that the way to make tying doctrine
* Keith N. Hylton is Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law, and Michael
Salinger is Professor and Chairman of the Finance and Economics Department, Boston
University School of Management. Both have served as consultants to Microsoft Corporation. We thank Ron Cass and David Evans for helpful comments. The views expressed
herein are solely those of the authors.
I Warren S. Grimes, The Antitrust Tying Law Schism: A Critique of Microsoft III and a
Response to Hylton and Salinger, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 199 (2002).
2 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Microsoft III).
Keith N. Hylton & Michael Salinger, Tying Law and Policy: A Decision-TheoreticApproach,
69 ANTITRUST LJ. 469 (2001).
4 See infra Part II.
-'Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 541 (1992).
6
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984). See infra Parts II & V;
Hylton & Salinger, supra note 3, at 470.
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coherent is to formulate it in light of that essential issue. 7 We do not
find him to be persuasive on this point. We do see a "schism" over tying
law that has asymmetries at its heart, but the key asymmetry does not
concern information.8 Neither does it primarily concern the lock-in
effects that lie at the heart of Eastman Kodak,9 a case in which the fundamental issues are not exclusively, or even primarily, about tying. Rather,
the major disagreements over tying policy concern what it means to have
a symmetric policy in markets where firms are asymmetrically situated
either because of the outcome of previous rounds of competition or
because of their participation in other markets. 10
II. THE RELATIVE FREQUENCY OF HARMFUL AND
BENEFICIAL TIES
We argued in our article that the vast majority of tie-ins are beneficial,
thatjudges would inevitably on occasion not be able to distinguish beneficial from harmful ties, and that, as a consequence, the standards for
establishing an illegal tie should be high." Professor Grimes challenges
our assertion about the relative rate of beneficial and harmful ties and
2
suggests that we place too little faith in judges to ascertain harmful ties.'
A.

THE FREQUENCY OF HARMFUL TIES

We illustrated the decision-theoretic approach with hypothetical proportions of beneficial and harmful ties and of judicial error rates.1 3 In
reaction to that analysis, Professor Grimes writes, "Unfortunately, the
authors offer only hypothesized data, with no evident means for empirical
verification." 14 While Professor Grimes may have intended this as a criticism, we neither disagree with it nor do we take it as criticism. There
should be no dispute that judicial error is possible. There should be no
7 Grimes, supra note 1, at 199.

' See infra Part III.A.
9 See infra Part III.B.
'oSee infra Part III.C.
"Hylton & Salinger, supra note 3, at 498.
2 Grimes, supra note 1, at 217.
's Hylton & Salinger, supra note 3, at 500. In our example, 99.9% of ties were beneficial.
We did not intend that figure to be our subjective estimate of the fraction of tie-ins that
are beneficial. It would be absurd to hazard such a guess rounded to the tenth of a
percent. We did indicate, however, that our subjective estimate was that "the vast majority"
of ties are beneficial.

11Grimes, supra note 1, at 215.
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dispute that the possibility of judicial error is relevant for establishing
legal standards. 5 There should be no dispute that, in light of the possibility of judicial error, the relative frequency of beneficial and harmful ties
is relevant for decision making. Finally, there should be no dispute that
these probabilities are not subject to precise, objective measurement.
Under such circumstances, there is no choice but to make subjective
estimates, 16 and whatever decision-making process one uses will necessarily embody implicit estimates.
Whether or not this combination of points is unfortunate, one should
not pretend that the points are not true. Professor Grimes does, though,
when he extols the "empiricism" of the courts. He would have courts
review the facts of each case under a legal standard that assumes the
arguments of each side to be equally plausible ex ante-or, as one
suspects of a per se standard, assumes the plaintiffs arguments to be
more plausible. It is precisely this approach that will lead to more false
convictions than false acquittals if most ties are beneficial and if the law
17
has not quite figured out how to tell beneficial from hamful ties.
To be sure, this begs the question whether we were persuasive about
our two main points: that the vast majority of ties are beneficial and
that the literature has not identified with precision how to distinguish
beneficial and harmful ties. With regard to the second point, we tried
in our article to present the post-Chicago models in a form that would
be accessible to the legal community. 18 It is our judgment 19 as economists

"5

This point is not specific to tying law or even to antitrust law. It is a general point
about legal standards. Without the possibility of legal error, the distinction between a
presumption of innocence and a presumption of guilt would not be fundamental.
16See ROBERT D. MASON, DOUGLAS A. LIND, & WILLIAM G. MARCHAL, STATISTICAL
TECHNIQUES IN BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 145-48 (10th ed. 1999) for a discussion of the
need to use subjective estimates of probability when objective estimates are not available.
17One might argue that judges would be wise enough to take these prior probabilities
into account in making their judgments. There are two reasons to question this argument,
though. First, ignoring prior probabilities is one of the ways in which human decision
making is systematically irrational. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974). Second, embodying a set of
prior probabilities into legal standards will help make the prior probabilities used by
different judges consistent with each other.
18Hylton & Salinger, supra note 3, at 488.
19Michael Whinston, the author of the seminal post-Chicago economics article on tying,
recently observed that what is most striking about the state of economic knowledge about
tying is how little we know. He also observed that tying doctrine should be based on the
relative frequency of harmful and beneficial ties. See Michael D. Whinston, Exclusivity and
Tying in U.S. v. Microsoft: What We Know, and Don't Know, 15 J. EcoN. PERSP. 63, 79
(Spring 2001).
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that the literature provides little guidance, but our intent was to let
20
others judge for themselves.
With respect to the first point, Professor Grimes argues that in making
our judgment, we ignored the distinction between "bundles" and "tieins."2 1 Bundles pass some initial screen for being obviously legal whereas
tie-ins do not. To quote Professor Grimes, "a bundled sale does not
become a tie-in unless there is substantial demand for the sale of the
bundled products as separate items and unless the seller is able to force
the bundled sale on an unwilling buyer." 22 The forcing criterion rules
out packaged sales in which the individual components are available
separately and the discount for the bundle is not too great. Thus, a tiein, under Grimes's terms, involves a case where many consumers would
purchase the bundled items separately and some of them would definitely
prefer to buy one of the bundled items from a source other than the
bundling seller.
We will use the term packaged sales to refer to the combination of
bundles and tie-ins. Packaged sales in which the components are available
separately are bundles. Of course, this requires some qualification. Even
if the components are available separately, a packaged good could be a
tie-in if the discount for the bundle is large enough.
As Professor Grimes points out, the Jefferson Parishstandard embodies
his distinction between bundles and tie-ins-and, for simplicity, we may
treat his distinction as a rough demarcation of the boundary of the per
se rule. Because tie-ins are a subset of packaged sales and those classified

20Professor Grimes criticizes our review of this literature for having neglected the
literature on raising rivals' costs. What is striking about the post-Chicago models of anticompetitive tying is, however, that raising rivals' costs is not the mechanism through which tying
is anticompetitive. Rather, what makes tying anticompetitive is that it denies competitors
adequate scale. The post-Chicago literature on tying is distinct from the post-Chicago
literature on vertical integration, in which the anticompetitive mechanism is raising rivals'
costs. See Michael A. Salinger, Vertical Megers and Market Foreclosure, 103 QJ. EcON. 373
(1988); Janusz A. Ordover et al., Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure, 80 Am. ECON. REv. 127
(1990); Oliver Hart & Jean Tirole, Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EcONoMIc ACTIVITY -MICROECONoMIcs

205 (1990); Michael A. Salinger,

Vertical Mergers in Multi-Product Industries and Edgeworth 's Paradox of Taxation, 40 J. INDUS.
ECON. 545 (1991). As we noted, this feature of the tying models makes them much more
problematic as a foundation for antitrust hostility toward tying. See Hylton & Salinger,
supra note 3, at 508.
1 In essence, Professor Grimes's argument is that the law contains a filter for screening
out cases so that most of those that pass the screen are indeed harmful. This argument
is the "sophisticated" potential critique that we anticipated and attempted to address in
our article. See Hylton & Salinger, supra note 3, at 501.
22Grimes, supra note 1, at 216.
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as bundles are not anticompetitive, it is trivially true that the fraction of
tie-ins that are anticompetitive is smaller than the fraction of packaged
sales. When we argued that tie-ins are ubiquitous and that most tie-ins
are beneficial, however, we meant tie-ins as we use the term here, not
packaged goods.
To bolster his claim that tie-ins represent a small and especially dangerous subset of the larger set of packaged goods, Professor Grimes gives
five examples of packaged goods that he labels as bundles rather than
tie-ins: cold tablets, right and left shoes, degree programs, cars and
steering wheels, and cameras and lenses.23 Of these, we agree with him
on the first two. The remaining examples are not so easily thrown into
the bundles category and actually support our argument that tie-ins are
widespread and, for the most part, beneficial.
Start with the cold tablet and the shoes. Because the individual medications are available separately, the combination of several medications
into a single cold tablet does not involve forcing. 24 Similarly, the practice
of selling shoes in pairs is not a tie-in. Although the individual items are
not available separately, virtually everyone who wants shoes wants them
in pairs, and the savings in packaging and transactions costs from selling
25
them as pairs rather than individually are obviously non-trivial.
We disagree with Professor Grimes's categorization of degree programs at law schools as bundles rather than tie-ins. 2 6 While some courses
are available separately, it is likely that some courses taught in degree
programs are difficult to obtain on a stand-alone basis. 27 Moreover, even
when courses of the same title are offered in degree and non-degree
programs, the non-degree versions might differ systematically in rigor
and quality. Thus, degree programs are not analogous to cold tablets.
Neither do degree programs fit the shoe category, in which virtually
everyone has identical preferences for what should be in the package.
Even if all students want the same mix of services, a significant number
23 Id.
2 This example occurs in an industry in which the scale economies are small enough
and the market is big enough that it is feasible to offer the individual items as well as the
separate items.
25A single box for two shoes uses less material than would separate boxes for each shoe.
Shoe sales staff can no doubt do their jobs more efficiently without having to search for
the right and left shoes of a pair.
26 This example is one we used. See Hylton & Salinger, supra note 3, at 486.
27For example, Boston University offers courses to students who are not degree candidates through Metropolitan College, its continuing education division. Some of the courses
at Metropolitan College have similar titles and presumably similar content to courses
offered exclusively to degree candidates. However, there are many courses offered at
Boston University that have no close substitute at Metropolitan College.
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of students might like to satisfy the requirements for a degree with
courses from different schools.

28

Consider the decision faced by students choosing between the Southwestern University School of Law (Southwestern) and one of its nearby
competitors. The prospective students might prefer to have Professor
Grimes's course on antitrust law but the other school's professor on
some other topic. Competition on the merits would seem to dictate that
the students choose. Based on our reading of the single-product test in
Jefferson Parish,the different courses would count as separate products,
and the packaging of courses that every school does counts as a tie-in
29
under Grimes's terms, not a bundle.
A fourth example that Professor Grimes categorizes as a bundle rather
than a tie-in is steering wheels and cars. 30 We agree with this specific
categorization, but there are other ways in which cars entail tie-ins. One
is radios. It is not unusual for people to replace the radio that comes
with a car with a more sophisticated sound system. Anyone who does so
would presumably prefer to buy the car without the radio that comes as
1
standard equipment and to receive a discount.3
28The percentage of students wanting to take courses at other institutions is likely to
be much greater than the percentage of sneaker customers who would want, say, a Nike
left sneaker and a Reebok right sneaker.
2 This example is not fanciful. With the development of Internet-delivered courses, it
is quite plausible that students will ask for credit for courses taken online. If the legal
standard permitted it, providers of those courses might have a sufficient stake to sue any
college that refused to grant the credit. We do not necessarily mean to suggest that
universities violate the law either in refusing non-degree students access to some of their
courses or in placing restrictions on courses from outside the university that count toward
a degree. There are many universities, so no university has the market power to be judged
guilty of an illegal tie-in. The analogy to Jefferson Parish is quite close. For the per se rule
to apply, the case must pass a high hurdle for market power. Surgery and degree programs
differ in one important respect, however. The economic relationship between an educational institution and a student enrolled in a multi-year degree program is relatively longterm, and the contract governing it is incomplete. Students enroll with some expectations
about what courses will be available during the term of the program and who will teach
them. Consider a student who enrolls at Southwestern in part to take antitrust law from
Professor Grimes. In the year that the student would like to take antitrust, suppose Professor
Grimes goes on sabbatical or accepts a post at another school. Or, to introduce a littie
forcing, suppose Southwestern replaces Professor Grimes with a Chicago theorist. Under
Eastman Kodak, it would seem that Southwestern Law School would be judged to have
market power and that Southwestern would be guilty of an illegal tie-in if it did not allow
a student to take the antitrust law course of his choice.
10Grimes, supra note 1, at 216.
3IAlso, car manufacturers make available a set of options that are either additions to
or replacements of "standard equipment." In some cases, they make these options available
primarily in certain combinations. An example of two options that might be combined
is leather seats and power windows. Even if the options are technically offered separately,
a customer might find it virtually impossible to find a car with one but not the other. It
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Professor Grimes's fifth example, cameras and lenses, involves the
same issues as the car example just discussed, so we see no need to
deconstruct it. What these examples reveal, however, is the great uncertainty surrounding perhaps the most important boundary between lawful
and unlawful packaging. It sounds persuasive, initially, to say that the
law distinguishes between bundles and tie-ins and applies only to the
latter. But packages are not labeled that way, and the basic characteristics
of tie-ins, to the extent they can be defined, seem to be present in a vast
array of packaged sales.
The common thread that links degree programs, cars, and many other
examples is that despite the vast array of goods offered in the economy,
they are in fact a small subset of the goods that conceivably could be
offered. If there were no transaction costs or scale economies, it would
be possible to tailor offerings to each customer's exact specification. But
scale economies and transactions costs are an economic reality. As a
consequence, consumers are routinely unable to buy exactly what they
most prefer.
B.

THE EFFICIENCY SCREEN

Professor Grimes suggests that the vast majority of packaged sales are
"almost always procompetitive" and that the law does not apply to these
sales. 32 Yet, under Jefferson Parish, the fact that a significant number of
consumers would prefer to buy components in an unpackaged form is
sufficient to make them separate goods and therefore potentially subject
to the per se rule. So far as we can tell, there is nothing in the letter of
the prevailing legal standard that allows a balancing of the interests of
those who benefit from the packaging against those who are harmed by
it, even when the gain from the packaging is obviously greater than
the cost.
Indeed, Jefferson Parishoffers a fairly clear refutation of the claim that
the tying prohibition does not apply to obviously efficient or procompetitive cases. The trial court had held that because the closed anesthesiology
department at EastJefferson Hospital was efficient, it did not violate the
Sherman Act.33 The Supreme Court, by upholding the trial court on the
is likely that there are customers who would like one but not the other and, if they take
the package, feel "forced" to take a feature they do not want.
s2Grimes, supra note 1, at 216.
31 Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 513 F. Supp 532, 540-42 (D. La. 1981),
rev'd, 686 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 466 U.S. 2 (1984). The district court concluded:
The evidence presented was that defendants instituted a closed system anesthesiology department because they believed the system resulted in the best quality of
patient care. Specifically, the system insures twenty-four hour anesthesiology
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completely different rationale that the market for anesthesiology services
remained competitive in spite of the tie-in, implicitly rejected "obvious
efficiency" as a basis for refusing to apply the tying prohibition.
Worse still, if one examines private tying litigation, one finds areas in
which tying law has become an obstacle to some obviously efficient
arrangements. Private tying lawsuits provide the ideal testing ground for
determining how well the law stays within the neat boundaries drawn by
Professor Grimes. The main reason for this is that private lawsuits are
brought almost exclusively by businesses-interestingly, almost never
consumers-that think they have been wrongly shut out of some substantial market. These cases should easily satisfy the two-pronged definition
of a tie-in because there will be substantial demand for the packaged
products separately, and a definite group of purchasers (usually the
plaintiffs) that can point to a preferable alternative source.
Within the set of private lawsuits, it is not at all hard to find cases in
which the courts were extremely reluctant to credit the seller's efficiency
defense, even when one might call the defense obvious. For example,
34
in Anderson Foreign Motors, Inc. v. New England Toyota Distributor,Inc.,
the plaintiff dealer contended the distributor's requirement that dealers
accept delivery by the distributor's own trucks constituted an illegal tiein, under Sherman Act Section 1, of the car and the delivery service.
The distributor offered two fairly obvious customer goodwill (a type of
efficiency) defenses. First, the distributor argued it was important to its
business that dealers got cars on time; and, second, that it wanted to
ensure that far-away dealers did not have a cost disadvantage relative to
the dealers located close to the distributor. The court dismissed these
defenses on the ground that there were less restrictive alternatives available. To allow the defendant to prevail, said the court, would go against
the tradition of restricting goodwill defenses to narrow fact settings, in
particular, where the tie-in is absolutely necessary to recognize the
claimed efficiency. 35 (This should be a troubling result to Professor
Grimes, as the goodwill defense is based, as we will make clear below,
coverage, aids in the control and standardization of operations because it is not
necessary to accommodate physicians with outside commitments; it permits the
physicians, nurses and other technicians in the department to develop a work
routine and a proficiency with the equipment they use in patient treatment; and
it increases the Board's ability to monitor the medical standards exercised because
there are fewer individuals involved, maintenance of equipment is simplified and
equipment breakdowns are minimized by limiting use to one group of physicians.
Id. at 540.
34475 F. Supp. 973 (D. Mass. 1979).
31 Id. at 984.
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on the sort of obvious and important information concerns that he is
so eager to see the law confront honestly.)
As another example of the way courts have treated obvious efficiencies
under tying doctrine, consider Siegel v. Chicken Delight,3 6 a case that
spawned a wave of litigation between franchisors and franchisees. The
franchisor (Chicken Delight) conditioned the grant of the franchise on
the purchase of a list of items that were neither produced by the franchisor nor specially designed for the franchised business. The court held
that Chicken Delight could not shield itself with the single-product
defense because the items tied to the trademark (the tying "product")
were commonplace articles. 37 To the extent the franchisor's concern was
controlling the quality of these items, a less restrictive alternative was
imposing quality requirements on franchisees. 38 One clear limit to this
doctrine was later established in Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins,3 9 where the court
held that Baskin-Robbins could "tie" its trademark to the sale of its own
ice cream because the two were an inseparable product.
Each of these cases-Anderson, Chicken Delight, and Baskin-Robbinswas essentially a contract dispute in which one side got the benefit of
the bargain and then sought to have the contract declared a violation
of the Sherman Act. It is certainly possible that a contract could be
socially undesirable and therefore should not be enforced by a court.
For example, a contract between two competitors to fix prices is obviously
undesirable, as well as a violation of the Sherman Act. However, in each
of these distributor-dealer cases there are highly plausible, one might
say obvious, efficiencies involved in the contractual relationship. A franchisor, such as Chicken Delight, might find it preferable to reduce or
eliminate franchise fees and instead use paper products as a metering
device. To the extent this reduces monitoring costs (with respect to
franchisee revenue and quality), it provides a savings dividend that can
be split between the contracting parties. Why tying doctrine should
40
interject itself as an obstacle to these efficiencies is a mystery.
36448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971).
37Id. at 48-50.
31Id. at 51-52.

39664 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1982).
40Professor Grimes notes that Chicken Delight and Anderson were decided before Jefferson
Parishand are, consequently, "of limited value as an indicator of current separate-products
analysis." Grimes, supra note 1, at 218 n.64. This statement is valid with respect to Chicken
Delight, but less so with respect to Anderson, where the court carefully worked through the
separate-products test of Jerrold Electronics (United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F.
Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), affd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961)). The separate-products
test of Jefferson Parishis essentially the same as that of JerroldElectronics.Still, we are willing
to concede that since the 1970s courts have moved more in the direction of allowing
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III. TAKING FULL ACCOUNT OF EASTMAN KODAK
Professor Grimes takes issue with our treatment of the Eastman Kodak
case. 41 We argued that courts had found it difficult to reconcile Jefferson
Parish and Eastman Kodak and that they had therefore viewed the latter
as applying to the limited set of cases in which a firm changes policies
on locked-in customers.42 He disputes both our reading of how courts
have used Eastman Kodak and questions whether it is appropriate to
construe a Supreme Court decision so narrowly.
It remains true that, as a logical matter, one can reconcile the two
decisions by viewing Eastman Kodak as applying to a limited set of circumstances. That said, we agree with Professor Grimes that reconciling the
decisions through a tight construction of Eastman Kodak is problematic.
However, the problem should be resolved by the Court overturning the
modified per se rule of Jefferson Parish and instead adopting rule of
reason analysis.
Eastman Kodak simply reinforces the fundamental problem of trying
to retrofit the per se rule to conform to a desirable policy on tying. Thus,
even if one can technically reconcile the two decisions, it is harder to
reconcile the broad approaches of having the antitrust laws apply to
relatively narrow examples of market power (EastmanKodak) and to use
the market power standard as a fine filter to limit what would otherwise
be an overly broad tying standard (Jefferson Parish). Moreover, even if
one does view tying policy in isolation, the strict market power screen
ofJefferson Parishis not a sufficient fix. There will be cases when a company
has market power in the tying good and tying is efficient (i.e., enhancing
overall consumer welfare) even though a significant number of consumers are harmed by the tie. If tying doctrine is not modified to come to
grips with that basic economic reality, then it will not be the policy that
best serves consumers.
IV. ASYMMETRIES-INFORMATIONAL AND OTHERS
Professor Grimes writes in his introduction that the treatment of informational asymmetries is the source of the major disagreements about
obvious efficiencies as defenses under the separate-products analysis. We do not, however,
agree with Grimes that the limited scope for efficiency defenses under current doctrine
is as great as it would be under a rule of reason analysis. For our views on the connection
between efficiency and the Jefferson Parishseparate-products analysis, see Hylton & Salinger,
supra note 3, at 478. Indeed, the Jefferson Parish analysis, which focuses on consumer
demand, could be viewed as a step backward from an earlier movement in the case law
toward explicit consideration of efficiencies under the separate-products inquiry. SeeJack
Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Building, Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 703-04 (7th Cir. 1984).
41Grimes, supra note 1, at 219-20.
42 Hylton & Salinger, supra note 3, at 481.
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tying policy. 43 We agree that the treatment of asymmetries lies at the
heart of many antitrust debates, including the ones on tying. We do not
agree, however, that the fundamental asymmetries are informational.
A.

INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES

As we argued above, companies, as a practical matter, can offer only
a small subset of the goods that could potentially be offered. 44 Because
consumers have heterogeneous preferences, they inevitably will settle
for goods that do not meet their ideal specifications in many instances.
And because most goods could be broken down into more than one
component, it also is inevitable that consumers are forced to pay for a
component they do not want to get one or more components that
they do. These issues would arise even if all consumers were perfectly
informed, and they lie at the heart of the controversies surrounding
tying doctrine.
To be sure, informational asymmetries sometimes play a role in tying.
Tying can occur precisely because some customers prefer not to devote
the effort they would need to be informed about some aspect of their
purchase. In surgery, for example, many patients might prefer to rely on
the hospital's judgment about the qualification of the anesthesiologists
rather than have to become sufficiently knowledgable to make their own
judgment. Under such circumstances, we do not agree with Professor
Grimes's assessment that tying policy should pay special attention to the
preferences of the informed. Their preferences should count, but they
should not count disproportionately.
Contrary to the views of Professor Grimes and Kodak proponents, we
suspect that where information plays a substantial role in the decision
to bundle, the vast majority of tie-ins are designed with a procompetitive
purpose, to enhance the provision of information to uninformed customers. Hospitals that force patients to use anesthesiologists chosen by the
hospital are motivated in part by the desire to lower the real cost of
surgery to the patient by saving the patient the search expense of finding
a good anesthesiologist or the injury expenses due to a bad anesthesiologist. The car manufacturer that provides the consumer with a car
equipped with tires on it is saving the consumer the search expense of
finding good tires and the injury expenses due to bad tires. Information
is a real cost that manufacturers and consumers have a joint interest in

1sGrimes,

supranote 1, at 199.
44See supra Part II.
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minimizing. 5 If the law were to prevent car manufacturers from bundling
tires with cars, informed consumers would continue to find good tires
at a reasonable expense, but the average consumer most likely would
be worse off. To be sure, the manufacturer could give the consumer a
detailed set of specifications that car tires should meet. But once the
consumer ventured out into the market on his own, he would be met
with the babel of conflicting claims from tire sellers.
The ironic part of the Kodak proponents' plea to "take information
seriously" is that they really want only certain information arguments
favorable to their assumptions-e.g., the lock-in argument-to be heard
by courts. The defense that tying is a method of protecting consumer
goodwill is, in essence, an information argument. Courts have been
hostile to the goodwill defense-and Kodak proponents probably view
this hostility as well founded. However, any effort to make tying doctrine
a more receptive environment for information arguments should include
a plea to expand the goodwill defense beyond the beachhead established
in the Jerrold Electronics decision. And once courts really start taking
information seriously, we will have arrived at something close to a rule
of reason standard.
B.

ASYMMETRIES WITH DURABLES

Eastman Kodak raises the issue of the role of antitrust in preventing
the exercise of short-run monopoly power. This is not exclusively or
even primarily about tying, but it does raise a fundamental issue. Those
who enter into long-term economic relationships, including the purchasers of durable equipment that require supplies or maintenance, reasonably can be expected to understand that they should be concerned about
lifetime costs, not just the initial price. When a supplier takes an action
that raises the price to its existing customers, is that an antitrust violation?
There are a number of arguments that one could make as to why it
should not be. First, one might argue that if the firm continues to
45

In United States v. Jerrold Elecronics Corp, 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), afl'd per
cur/am, 365 U.S. 567 (1961), the Court ruled that Jerrold had to stop selling its cable
television systems with installation and maintenance even though there were valid business
reasons for doing so. The Court's reason was thatJerrold had less restrictive means at its
disposal in order to accomplish the same purpose. Specifically, it could try to persuade
purchasers that its installation and maintenance services were worth the expense. This
reasoning treats information and other transactions costs as being something other than
real costs. It is perfectly plausible that if Jerrold had operated in a competitive business,
it might have well decided that selling systems without maintenance was unprofitable.
Such a decision would be similar to a university deciding to offer courses only to degree
candidates. In light of the fact that Jerrold's prospects of getting paid depended on the
functioning of the system, such a decision would seem particularly defensible.

2002]

REPLY TO GRIMES

participate in a competitive market for new customers (who are concerned about lifetime costs), the price increases on the "back end"
of the relationship ultimately hurt it.46 A second argument concerns
reputation effects. Under this argument, although a seller might well
be able to exploit its existing customers while appearing to remain
competitive in attracting new customers, companies have an incentive
to establish reputations for not abusing existing customers. A third argument is that customers likely would recognize the importance of lifetime
costs and would seek contractual protection against this sort of opportunistic behavior. To the extent that they do, one aspect of the competition
among sellers to make the initial sale would be to provide such protection.
We are sympathetic to Professor Grimes's point that these arguments,
which are typical of the Chicago style, by themselves are not completely
persuasive. However, these arguments are not, at their core, specifically
about tying.4 7A seller in a long-term relationship can behave opportunistically with respect to its customers simply by raising prices. 48 A restrictive
tying policy cannot by itself prevent this class of behavior.
C.

ASYMMETRIC COMPETITIVE POSITIONS

To the extent deep divides exist in the antitrust community that are
exclusively about tying, they concern situations in which competing firms
have asymmetric market positions.49 Asymmetries can arise when there
are successive generations of products. The firm that dominates at one
time enters the competition for the next generation in a fundamentally
different position from the firms competing to replace it. 50 Asymmetries
also arise when one of the firms competing in one product has a
46

As several commentators have observed, however, this argument by itself is not persuasive. See Grimes, supra note 1, at 201 n.9. Consider a durable good for which the market
expected lifetime price is $2000. Suppose a company charges $1000 initially with the
mutual understanding that $1000 in maintenance will follow. Once the company sells a
certain number of units at $1000, raising the price of maintenance to $1500 while cutting
the initial price to $500 would keep the company competitive for new customers while
leaving the existing customers no choice but to pay $500 more than was anticipated.
47
As noted in Part II supra, these issues come up in the tying context because the
standards in tying doctrine are favorable to plaintiffs.
48
Specifically, Kodak could have accomplished the anticompetitive objective alleged in
the case by increasing the prices of replacement parts.
19Compare RichardJ. Gilbert & Michael L. Katz, An Economist's Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft,
15 J. ECON. PERSP. 25 (Spring 2001) with Benjamin Klein, The Microsoft Case: What Can
a DominantFirm Do to Defend Its Market Position? 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 45 (Spring 2001).
10Richard Gilbert, Preemptive Competition, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ANALYSIS OF
MARKET STRUCTURE 90 (Joseph Stiglitz & Frank Mathewson eds., 1986); Richard Gilbert
& David Newbery, Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly, 72 AM. ECON. REV.
514 (1982).
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dominant position in a complementary product. 51 Both classes of situations raise issues that are specifically about tying, and both are at play
in Microsoft IIL.
In the part of our article surveying post-Chicago models of tying, we
argued that the literature had established the theoretical possibility of
abuse in these situations. We concluded, though, that using these models
to justify antitrust hostility toward tying is problematic.5 2 Consider first
the complementary products case. Widgets and gadgets are complements. Firm A is dominant in widgets and is one of the firms competing
in gadgets. The structure of the gadget market-perhaps because of
production scale economies or perhaps because of network effects-is
likely to be imperfectly competitive. A broad policy issue is whether it
is desirable to handicap Firm A in the gadget market by placing restrictions on how aggressively it competes. One might argue that there should
be no restrictions on normal competitive practices-pricing and quality
decisions-but tying should not be allowed. This position becomes
harder to maintain, however, once Firm A wants to charge a price of zero
for gadgets. Providing a free gadget with every widget is indistinguishable
from tying.
Now consider the case of successive generations of competition. Again,
Firm A is dominant in the current generation of widgets. Tying can
come into play in two ways. First, widgets themselves have potentially
separable components. A competitor has what it believes to be a superior
version of one but not both of the components. It might like to force
firm A to unbundle its offering. By the same token, suppose that the
next generation of widgets will have new features and that one of the
possible new features is a gadget. If antitrust law allows Firm A's decision
to include a gadget to be challenged as an illegal tie, Firm A may be barred
from making an improvement that its competitors are free to make.
The great schisms in antitrust concern these kinds of situations. On
the one hand, it is an important objective of antitrust policy to make
sure that Firm A's dominance of the current generation of widgets is
not unfairly or abusively exploited in the next generation of widgets or
gadgets. By the same token, however, a policy that biases the successive
rounds of competition so that they are won by different companies or
that different companies prevail in the competitions for complementary
products also is undesirable because it blocks real efficiencies.
51Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure,and Exclusion, 80 Am. ECON. REv. 837 (1990).
Hylton & Salinger, supra note 3, at 488.
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V. IMPLICATIONS (WITHIN THE CONTEXT
OF DECISION THEORY)
Current tying doctrine does not leave significant room for an efficiency
defense. At the very least, we believe that the modified per se rule should
be abandoned for a rule of reason that would allow such a defense. The
possibilities for the legal standards, however, are much richer than a
choice among per se legality, per se illegality, and the rule of reason.
The details of the standards for what has to be established and by whom
are crucial.
In comparing Chicago School theorists with what he calls antitrust
traditionalists, Professor Grimes characterizes the latter as empiricists.
By this, he presumably means that the Chicago School arguments are
entirely theoretical and that they often are "proven" wrong by careful
examination of the facts of individual cases. We submit, though, that
the facts are rarely as clear as Professor Grimes suggests. Consider the
following thought experiment: Is it conceivable that a different judge
would have reached a different conclusion in Microsoft IIIthan did judge
Jackson? If so, then one of them would have had to be wrong. Who the
theorists are and who the empiricists are in this debate are not clear. At
best, both the Chicago and post-Chicago literatures represent theory
that formalizes casual empiricism.
Sensible policy must take into account the risk ofjudicial error. Indeed,
many aspects of antitrust policy already do just that. Consider, for example, the different treatments of predatory pricing and price fixing. To
prevail in the former, a plaintiff must demonstrate a dangerous probability of success. To prevail in the latter, a plaintiff need not show that the
price fixing was effective, in the sense of changing the market price.
The difference in the two standards is due to differences in error costs.
False convictions-both actual and potential-in predatory pricing cases
are particularly damaging because they penalize competitive behavior.
False convictions in price fixing do not pose the same risk.
Decision theory is clear that in the presence of uncertainty about
the competitive effects of tying, the relative frequencies of abusive and
beneficial ties are a relevant consideration. Previous articles about
decision-theoretic approaches to legal doctrine have stressed the role of
relative error costs (which may be just as hard to determine objectively
as the relative probabilities). We believe that one of the primary contributions of our article was to point out the well-established but generally
overlooked relevance of prior probabilities. 3 While the system must rely
53It is even well established that the relevance of prior probabilities is typically overlooked. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 17.
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on judges to weigh the facts of individual cases, it is not the role of
individual judges to assess the prior probabilities in every case. Rather,
these need to be embodied in the legal standards.
Although highly relevant for tying policy, the relative frequencies of
beneficial and harmful ties are not objectively observable. There is no
alternative to basing the policy on subjective estimates. We have argued
that beneficial tying is much more common than harmful tying. Professor
Grimes has argued the opposite case. Ultimately, it is the judgment of
the people who establish the legal standards through laws and the decisions that interpret them that matter. We hope that our article will
stimulate others to offer assessments of the relative frequencies. We
persist in our assertion, though, that tying is everywhere and that those
who support antitrust hostility to tying must be much clearer than they
have been on when tying is harmful.

